LP-041: Relay VM

Abstract

The Relay VM runs the R-chain, a dedicated chain for cross-chain message

relaying. It is a sibling of the Bridge VM (B-chain, assets) and Oracle VM

(O-chain, data in): the R-chain moves arbitrary messages between chains

with verified inclusion proofs. Together B/O/R cover the three distinct

cross-chain concerns — assets, data, messages.

Precompile address nibble: C=B (see LP-129 Registry).

Scope

R-chain handles:

• Inbound message ingestion from external chains (Ethereum, Cosmos, etc.)
• Light-client header registry for every supported source chain
• Merkle/SSZ/Warp inclusion-proof verification against stored headers
• Outbound message delivery to destination chains via Warp
• Relayer registry + bonds, slashing on fraudulent proof submission

R-chain does NOT handle:

• Asset custody (Bridge VM / B-chain)
• External data feeds (Oracle VM / O-chain)
• Settlement proofs (Bridge VM signs custody releases, R-chain only forwards messages)

Boundary with Bridge VM

A typical cross-chain swap uses BOTH: Bridge VM holds the tokens,

Relay VM delivers the "release" instruction.

Specification

Light-Client Header Registry

Each supported source chain has a light-client header chain:

type SourceChain struct {
    ChainID         uint32
    ConsensusType   uint8    // 1=Ethereum, 2=Cosmos, 3=Warp-Lux, ...
    GenesisHeader   []byte
    LatestHeight    uint64
    LatestHeaderHash [32]byte
}

Headers arrive via relayer submissions. Each new header is verified against

the consensus protocol of the source chain (Ethereum's beacon consensus,

Cosmos Tendermint, etc.) before being accepted.

Message Envelope

type Message struct {
    SourceChainID   uint32
    DestChainID     uint32
    Nonce           uint64
    Sender          [20]byte
    Recipient       [20]byte
    Payload         []byte
    Proof           InclusionProof
}

Relayer Bonds

Relayers stake LUX to submit proofs. Submitting an invalid proof slashes

the full bond. Minimum bond: 100 LUX.

Rationale

Keeping bridge, oracle, and relay as separate chains:

• Separate signer sets (different economic security per function)
• Separate block cadence (oracle wants fast; bridge wants secure;

relay prioritizes liveness)

• Clear accountability when one subsystem misbehaves
• Independent liveness: if oracle stops, bridge still works

Consolidating them into one VM (as the deleted teleportvm tried) creates

a single point of failure and conflates distinct security properties.

Reference