LP-6475: LuxDA Sealed Messages

Abstract

This LP defines sealed message mode for LuxDA, where message content is encrypted under threshold TFHE and only revealed when specified conditions are met. This enables time-lock encryption, commit-reveal schemes, and other sealed-bid patterns.

Motivation

Sealed messages enable:

Time-Lock: Content revealed after time
Commit-Reveal: Commit now, reveal later
Sealed Bids: Bid without revealing amount
Dead Man's Switch: Reveal if no heartbeat

Specification

1. Sealed Message Structure

1.1 Sealed Envelope

type SealedMessage struct {
    // Envelope metadata (public)
    Version       uint8
    NamespaceId   [20]byte
    Epoch         uint64
    SenderPubKey  []byte

    // Encrypted payload key
    EncryptedKey []byte  // TFHE encrypted AES key

    // AES-encrypted content
    EncryptedContent []byte
    ContentMAC       []byte

    // Reveal conditions
    RevealConditions *RevealConditions

    // Signature
    Signature []byte
}

1.2 Two-Layer Encryption

Original Content
       ↓
  AES-256-GCM (with random key K)
       ↓
  Encrypted Content
       +
  Key K encrypted under TFHE (to committee)
       ↓
  Sealed Message

2. Reveal Conditions

2.1 Condition Types

type RevealConditions struct {
    // Primary condition
    Primary RevealCondition

    // Alternative conditions (OR)
    Alternatives []RevealCondition

    // Required signatures for override
    OverrideThreshold uint32
    OverrideSigners   []Identity
}

type RevealCondition struct {
    Type      ConditionType
    Params    []byte
    Deadline  uint64  // Must be met by this time, or message expires
}

type ConditionType uint8
const (
    // Time-based
    ConditionAfterTimestamp  ConditionType = 1
    ConditionAfterBlock      ConditionType = 2
    ConditionAfterDuration   ConditionType = 3

    // Event-based
    ConditionOnEvent         ConditionType = 4
    ConditionOnInclusion     ConditionType = 5

    // Approval-based
    ConditionNofMApproval    ConditionType = 6
    ConditionSenderApproval  ConditionType = 7

    // Absence-based (dead man's switch)
    ConditionNoHeartbeat     ConditionType = 8
)

2.2 Time-Lock Condition

type TimeLockParams struct {
    ReleaseTime uint64
}

func CheckTimeLock(params []byte) bool {
    var tlp TimeLockParams
    cbor.Unmarshal(params, &tlp)
    return uint64(time.Now().Unix()) >= tlp.ReleaseTime
}

2.3 Dead Man's Switch

type DeadManSwitchParams struct {
    HeartbeatInterval uint64
    LastHeartbeat     uint64
}

func CheckDeadManSwitch(params []byte, state *SealedMessageState) bool {
    var dms DeadManSwitchParams
    cbor.Unmarshal(params, &dms)

    lastHB := state.LastHeartbeat
    return uint64(time.Now().Unix()) > lastHB + dms.HeartbeatInterval
}

func SendHeartbeat(sealedMsgID [32]byte, senderSig []byte) error {
    // Update last heartbeat
    state := getSealedMessageState(sealedMsgID)
    state.LastHeartbeat = uint64(time.Now().Unix())
    return nil
}

3. Sealing Process

3.1 Seal Message

func SealMessage(
    content []byte,
    conditions *RevealConditions,
    nsId [20]byte,
    epoch uint64,
) (*SealedMessage, error) {
    // Generate random AES key
    aesKey := make([]byte, 32)
    rand.Read(aesKey)

    // Encrypt content with AES
    nonce := make([]byte, 12)
    rand.Read(nonce)
    aead, _ := cipher.NewGCM(aes.NewCipher(aesKey))
    encryptedContent := aead.Seal(nonce, nonce, content, nil)

    // Encrypt AES key under TFHE
    pk, _ := keyRegistry.GetPublicKey(nsId, epoch)
    encryptedKey := tfhe.EncryptBytes(pk, aesKey)

    return &SealedMessage{
        Version:          1,
        NamespaceId:      nsId,
        Epoch:            epoch,
        EncryptedKey:     encryptedKey,
        EncryptedContent: encryptedContent,
        RevealConditions: conditions,
    }, nil
}

4. Unsealing Process

4.1 Request Unseal

type UnsealRequest struct {
    SealedMsgRef  [32]byte
    Requester     Identity
    ConditionMet  ConditionType
    ConditionProof []byte
    Signature     []byte
}

func RequestUnseal(sealed *SealedMessage, conditionProof []byte) (*UnsealRequest, error) {
    // Identify which condition is met
    metCondition := findMetCondition(sealed.RevealConditions, conditionProof)
    if metCondition == nil {
        return nil, ErrNoConditionMet
    }

    return &UnsealRequest{
        SealedMsgRef:   computeSealedMsgRef(sealed),
        ConditionMet:   metCondition.Type,
        ConditionProof: conditionProof,
    }, nil
}

4.2 Unseal Execution

func Unseal(sealed *SealedMessage, shares []*DecryptionShare) ([]byte, error) {
    // Combine shares to decrypt TFHE key
    decryptedKey, err := CombineDecryptShares(shares, threshold)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    // Extract AES key
    aesKey := tfhe.DecodeBytes(decryptedKey)

    // Decrypt content
    nonce := sealed.EncryptedContent[:12]
    ciphertext := sealed.EncryptedContent[12:]
    aead, _ := cipher.NewGCM(aes.NewCipher(aesKey))

    plaintext, err := aead.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, ErrDecryptionFailed
    }

    return plaintext, nil
}

5. Sealed Message Lifecycle

5.1 State Machine

Created → Pending → [Condition Met] → Unsealing → Revealed
                 → [Expired] → Expired
                 → [Cancelled] → Cancelled

5.2 State Transitions

type SealedMessageState struct {
    Status        SealedStatus
    CreatedAt     uint64
    LastHeartbeat uint64
    UnsealedAt    uint64
    ExpiredAt     uint64
}

type SealedStatus uint8
const (
    SealedPending   SealedStatus = 1
    SealedUnsealing SealedStatus = 2
    SealedRevealed  SealedStatus = 3
    SealedExpired   SealedStatus = 4
    SealedCancelled SealedStatus = 5
)

6. Sender Controls

6.1 Cancel Sealed Message

type CancelRequest struct {
    SealedMsgRef [32]byte
    Reason       string
    SenderSig    []byte
}

func CancelSealed(req *CancelRequest) error {
    state := getSealedMessageState(req.SealedMsgRef)

    // Only pending messages can be cancelled
    if state.Status != SealedPending {
        return ErrCannotCancel
    }

    // Verify sender signature
    if !verifySenderSignature(req) {
        return ErrInvalidSignature
    }

    // Check cancellation allowed by conditions
    if !canCancel(state) {
        return ErrCancellationNotAllowed
    }

    state.Status = SealedCancelled
    return nil
}

6.2 Update Conditions

func UpdateConditions(
    sealedMsgRef [32]byte,
    newConditions *RevealConditions,
    senderSig []byte,
) error {
    // Verify sender
    // Check update allowed
    // Apply new conditions
    // Note: Cannot make conditions less restrictive
}

7. UX Constraints

7.1 Explicit Opt-In

// Sealed mode requires explicit namespace flag
type NamespacePolicy struct {
    SealedModeAllowed bool  // Must be true
}

7.2 Visibility

// Recipients see sealed envelope, not content
type SealedMessageView struct {
    From       Identity
    SentAt     uint64
    Status     SealedStatus
    Conditions *RevealConditions  // Public
    Preview    []byte            // Optional encrypted preview
}

7.3 Expiration

All sealed messages MUST have expiration:

const (
    MaxSealDuration = 365 * 24 * time.Hour  // 1 year max
    DefaultExpiry   = 30 * 24 * time.Hour   // 30 days default
)

8. Use Cases

8.1 Time-Locked Will

func CreateTimeLockWill(content []byte, releaseDate time.Time) (*SealedMessage, error) {
    conditions := &RevealConditions{
        Primary: RevealCondition{
            Type:   ConditionAfterTimestamp,
            Params: encodeTimestamp(releaseDate),
        },
        Alternatives: []RevealCondition{
            {
                Type:   ConditionNofMApproval,
                Params: encodeApprovers(executors, 2, 3),
            },
        },
    }

    return SealMessage(content, conditions, willNsId, currentEpoch)
}

8.2 Sealed Bid

func CreateSealedBid(amount uint64, auctionId [32]byte) (*SealedMessage, error) {
    conditions := &RevealConditions{
        Primary: RevealCondition{
            Type:   ConditionOnEvent,
            Params: encodeBidRevealEvent(auctionId),
        },
    }

    bidContent := encodeBid(amount, auctionId)
    return SealMessage(bidContent, conditions, auctionNsId, currentEpoch)
}

8.3 Dead Man's Switch

func CreateDeadManSwitch(content []byte, checkIn time.Duration) (*SealedMessage, error) {
    conditions := &RevealConditions{
        Primary: RevealCondition{
            Type: ConditionNoHeartbeat,
            Params: encodeHeartbeatParams(checkIn),
        },
        Alternatives: []RevealCondition{
            {
                Type:   ConditionSenderApproval,
                Params: nil,
            },
        },
    }

    return SealMessage(content, conditions, dmsNsId, currentEpoch)
}

Rationale

Why Two-Layer Encryption?

TFHE ciphertext size independent of content
Efficient for large content
Standard pattern

Why Explicit Conditions?

Transparency about reveal rules
Auditable
Programmable

Why Max Duration?

Committee changes over time
Key rotation
Prevent stale sealed messages

Backwards Compatibility

This specification introduces new functionality and does not modify existing protocols. It is fully backwards compatible with existing implementations.

Security Considerations

Key Escrow

Committee collectively holds unsealing power. Choose appropriate committee for trust model.

Premature Reveal

Mitigated by:

Condition verification
Multiple committee members
Honest threshold assumption

Denied Reveal