DEX & Trading
LP-9025
ReviewMEV Protection & Fair Ordering
Comprehensive MEV protection mechanisms, fair ordering protocols, and transaction privacy for DeFi
LP-9025: MEV Protection & Fair Ordering
Abstract
This LP defines MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) protection mechanisms, fair ordering protocols, and transaction privacy standards for Lux DeFi. Ensures users are protected from front-running, sandwich attacks, and other MEV extraction techniques.
Motivation
MEV protection is critical for:
- Protecting users from front-running
- Preventing sandwich attacks
- Ensuring fair transaction ordering
- Maintaining market integrity
- Building user trust
Specification
1. MEV Types & Mitigation
| MEV Type | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Front-running | Inserting tx before victim | Commit-reveal, encryption |
| Back-running | Inserting tx after victim | Time-based batching |
| Sandwich | Wrapping victim tx | Slippage protection, private mempool |
| JIT Liquidity | Just-in-time LP provision | MEV-aware routing |
| Liquidation | Racing to liquidate positions | Fair liquidation auction |
| Arbitrage | Cross-DEX price differences | Atomic execution |
2. Fair Ordering Protocol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
interface IFairOrdering {
enum OrderingMethod {
FIFO, // First-in-first-out
BATCH_AUCTION, // Batched with uniform clearing
COMMIT_REVEAL, // Two-phase submission
ENCRYPTED, // Threshold encrypted
RANDOM // Randomized ordering
}
struct OrderingConfig {
OrderingMethod method;
uint256 batchDuration;
uint256 revealWindow;
uint256 minParticipants;
bool mevProtectionEnabled;
}
struct CommitRevealOrder {
bytes32 commitment;
uint256 commitBlock;
bool revealed;
bytes orderData;
uint256 nonce;
}
// Commit phase
function commitOrder(bytes32 commitment) external returns (bytes32 orderId);
// Reveal phase
function revealOrder(
bytes32 orderId,
bytes calldata orderData,
bytes32 salt
) external;
// Batch execution
function executeBatch(uint256 batchId) external;
// Events
event OrderCommitted(bytes32 indexed orderId, address indexed user, uint256 commitBlock);
event OrderRevealed(bytes32 indexed orderId, bytes orderData);
event BatchExecuted(uint256 indexed batchId, uint256 ordersExecuted);
}
3. Commit-Reveal Implementation
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
contract CommitRevealDEX is IFairOrdering {
uint256 public constant COMMIT_WINDOW = 3; // blocks
uint256 public constant REVEAL_WINDOW = 3; // blocks
uint256 public constant EXECUTION_DELAY = 1; // blocks
mapping(bytes32 => CommitRevealOrder) public orders;
mapping(uint256 => bytes32[]) public batchOrders;
uint256 public currentBatch;
function commitOrder(bytes32 commitment) external override returns (bytes32 orderId) {
orderId = keccak256(abi.encode(msg.sender, commitment, block.number));
orders[orderId] = CommitRevealOrder({
commitment: commitment,
commitBlock: block.number,
revealed: false,
orderData: "",
nonce: 0
});
batchOrders[currentBatch].push(orderId);
emit OrderCommitted(orderId, msg.sender, block.number);
}
function revealOrder(
bytes32 orderId,
bytes calldata orderData,
bytes32 salt
) external override {
CommitRevealOrder storage order = orders[orderId];
require(!order.revealed, "Already revealed");
require(block.number >= order.commitBlock + COMMIT_WINDOW, "Commit window active");
require(block.number < order.commitBlock + COMMIT_WINDOW + REVEAL_WINDOW, "Reveal expired");
// Verify commitment
bytes32 expectedCommitment = keccak256(abi.encode(orderData, salt));
require(order.commitment == expectedCommitment, "Invalid reveal");
order.revealed = true;
order.orderData = orderData;
emit OrderRevealed(orderId, orderData);
}
function executeBatch(uint256 batchId) external override {
require(batchId < currentBatch, "Batch not ready");
bytes32[] storage orderIds = batchOrders[batchId];
// Shuffle orders to prevent ordering manipulation
_shuffleOrders(orderIds);
uint256 executed = 0;
for (uint i = 0; i < orderIds.length; i++) {
CommitRevealOrder storage order = orders[orderIds[i]];
if (order.revealed) {
_executeOrder(order.orderData);
executed++;
}
}
emit BatchExecuted(batchId, executed);
}
function _shuffleOrders(bytes32[] storage orderIds) internal {
// Fisher-Yates shuffle using block hash as randomness
for (uint i = orderIds.length - 1; i > 0; i--) {
uint j = uint(keccak256(abi.encode(blockhash(block.number - 1), i))) % (i + 1);
(orderIds[i], orderIds[j]) = (orderIds[j], orderIds[i]);
}
}
function _executeOrder(bytes memory orderData) internal {
// Decode and execute order
(address tokenIn, address tokenOut, uint256 amountIn, uint256 minOut) =
abi.decode(orderData, (address, address, uint256, uint256));
// Execute swap
}
function startNewBatch() external {
currentBatch++;
}
}
4. Batch Auction System
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
contract BatchAuctionDEX {
struct Batch {
uint256 startBlock;
uint256 endBlock;
uint256 clearingPrice;
bool settled;
Order[] buyOrders;
Order[] sellOrders;
}
struct Order {
address user;
uint256 amount;
uint256 limitPrice;
bool filled;
uint256 fillAmount;
}
uint256 public constant BATCH_DURATION = 12; // blocks (~2.5 min)
mapping(uint256 => Batch) public batches;
uint256 public currentBatchId;
event OrderSubmitted(uint256 indexed batchId, address indexed user, bool isBuy, uint256 amount, uint256 limitPrice);
event BatchSettled(uint256 indexed batchId, uint256 clearingPrice, uint256 volume);
function submitBuyOrder(uint256 amount, uint256 maxPrice) external {
_ensureCurrentBatch();
batches[currentBatchId].buyOrders.push(Order({
user: msg.sender,
amount: amount,
limitPrice: maxPrice,
filled: false,
fillAmount: 0
}));
emit OrderSubmitted(currentBatchId, msg.sender, true, amount, maxPrice);
}
function submitSellOrder(uint256 amount, uint256 minPrice) external {
_ensureCurrentBatch();
batches[currentBatchId].sellOrders.push(Order({
user: msg.sender,
amount: amount,
limitPrice: minPrice,
filled: false,
fillAmount: 0
}));
emit OrderSubmitted(currentBatchId, msg.sender, false, amount, minPrice);
}
function settleBatch(uint256 batchId) external {
Batch storage batch = batches[batchId];
require(block.number > batch.endBlock, "Batch not ended");
require(!batch.settled, "Already settled");
// Find clearing price using uniform price auction
uint256 clearingPrice = _findClearingPrice(batch);
batch.clearingPrice = clearingPrice;
// Fill orders at clearing price
uint256 totalVolume = _fillOrders(batch, clearingPrice);
batch.settled = true;
emit BatchSettled(batchId, clearingPrice, totalVolume);
}
function _findClearingPrice(Batch storage batch) internal view returns (uint256) {
// Sort buy orders descending, sell orders ascending
// Find intersection point
// This is a simplified version - production would use more efficient algo
uint256 bestPrice = 0;
uint256 maxVolume = 0;
// Try each price point
for (uint i = 0; i < batch.buyOrders.length; i++) {
uint256 price = batch.buyOrders[i].limitPrice;
uint256 buyVolume = _calculateBuyVolume(batch, price);
uint256 sellVolume = _calculateSellVolume(batch, price);
uint256 matchedVolume = buyVolume < sellVolume ? buyVolume : sellVolume;
if (matchedVolume > maxVolume) {
maxVolume = matchedVolume;
bestPrice = price;
}
}
return bestPrice;
}
function _calculateBuyVolume(Batch storage batch, uint256 price) internal view returns (uint256 volume) {
for (uint i = 0; i < batch.buyOrders.length; i++) {
if (batch.buyOrders[i].limitPrice >= price) {
volume += batch.buyOrders[i].amount;
}
}
}
function _calculateSellVolume(Batch storage batch, uint256 price) internal view returns (uint256 volume) {
for (uint i = 0; i < batch.sellOrders.length; i++) {
if (batch.sellOrders[i].limitPrice <= price) {
volume += batch.sellOrders[i].amount;
}
}
}
function _fillOrders(Batch storage batch, uint256 price) internal returns (uint256 totalVolume) {
// Fill all orders at clearing price
// Pro-rata if demand/supply imbalanced
return 0;
}
function _ensureCurrentBatch() internal {
if (block.number > batches[currentBatchId].endBlock) {
currentBatchId++;
batches[currentBatchId].startBlock = block.number;
batches[currentBatchId].endBlock = block.number + BATCH_DURATION;
}
}
}
5. Private Transaction Pool
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
interface IPrivateMempool {
struct PrivateTx {
bytes32 txHash;
bytes encryptedData;
uint256 submittedAt;
uint256 targetBlock;
bool executed;
}
// Submit encrypted transaction
function submitPrivateTx(
bytes calldata encryptedTx,
uint256 targetBlock
) external returns (bytes32 txId);
// Validator decrypts and includes
function decryptAndExecute(
bytes32 txId,
bytes calldata decryptionKey
) external;
// Flashbots-style bundle
function submitBundle(
bytes[] calldata txs,
uint256 targetBlock
) external returns (bytes32 bundleId);
}
contract MEVProtectedRouter {
IPrivateMempool public mempool;
mapping(address => bool) public trustedRelayers;
// Submit swap through private mempool
function protectedSwap(
address tokenIn,
address tokenOut,
uint256 amountIn,
uint256 minAmountOut,
uint256 deadline
) external {
// Encode swap data
bytes memory swapData = abi.encode(
msg.sender,
tokenIn,
tokenOut,
amountIn,
minAmountOut,
deadline
);
// Encrypt with threshold encryption
bytes memory encryptedData = _encryptForValidators(swapData);
// Submit to private mempool
mempool.submitPrivateTx(encryptedData, block.number + 1);
}
function _encryptForValidators(bytes memory data) internal view returns (bytes memory) {
// Threshold encryption implementation
// Data can only be decrypted when included in block
return data; // Simplified
}
}
6. Slippage Protection
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
library SlippageGuard {
uint256 constant MAX_BPS = 10000;
struct SlippageConfig {
uint256 maxSlippageBps; // User-defined max
uint256 dynamicSlippageBps; // Auto-calculated
bool useDynamicSlippage;
uint256 priceImpactLimit;
}
function calculateSafeSlippage(
uint256 amount,
uint256 poolLiquidity,
uint256 volatility
) internal pure returns (uint256 slippageBps) {
// Base slippage on trade size vs liquidity
uint256 sizeImpact = (amount * MAX_BPS) / poolLiquidity;
// Add volatility premium
uint256 volatilityPremium = volatility / 10; // 10% of volatility
slippageBps = sizeImpact + volatilityPremium + 50; // 0.5% base
// Cap at reasonable maximum
if (slippageBps > 500) slippageBps = 500; // 5% max
}
function validateExecution(
uint256 expectedOut,
uint256 actualOut,
uint256 maxSlippageBps
) internal pure returns (bool valid) {
uint256 minAcceptable = (expectedOut * (MAX_BPS - maxSlippageBps)) / MAX_BPS;
return actualOut >= minAcceptable;
}
}
contract SlippageProtectedSwap {
using SlippageGuard for *;
function swap(
address tokenIn,
address tokenOut,
uint256 amountIn,
uint256 minAmountOut,
uint256 deadline
) external returns (uint256 amountOut) {
require(block.timestamp <= deadline, "Expired");
// Get expected output
uint256 expectedOut = getQuote(tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn);
// Validate user's slippage tolerance
uint256 userSlippage = ((expectedOut - minAmountOut) * 10000) / expectedOut;
// Calculate safe slippage
uint256 liquidity = getPoolLiquidity(tokenIn, tokenOut);
uint256 volatility = getVolatility(tokenIn, tokenOut);
uint256 safeSlippage = SlippageGuard.calculateSafeSlippage(amountIn, liquidity, volatility);
// Warn if user slippage is too high
require(userSlippage <= safeSlippage * 2, "Slippage too high - MEV risk");
// Execute swap
amountOut = _executeSwap(tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn);
// Validate execution
require(amountOut >= minAmountOut, "Slippage exceeded");
return amountOut;
}
function getQuote(address, address, uint256) internal view returns (uint256) { return 0; }
function getPoolLiquidity(address, address) internal view returns (uint256) { return 0; }
function getVolatility(address, address) internal view returns (uint256) { return 0; }
function _executeSwap(address, address, uint256) internal returns (uint256) { return 0; }
}
7. MEV-Aware Routing
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.24;
contract MEVAwareRouter {
struct Route {
address[] path;
address[] pools;
uint256 expectedOutput;
uint256 mevRisk; // 0-100 score
uint256 priceImpact;
bool usesPrivatePool;
}
// Find optimal route considering MEV risk
function findOptimalRoute(
address tokenIn,
address tokenOut,
uint256 amountIn
) external view returns (Route memory bestRoute) {
Route[] memory routes = _findAllRoutes(tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn);
uint256 bestScore = 0;
for (uint i = 0; i < routes.length; i++) {
// Score = output * (1 - mevRisk/100) * (1 - priceImpact/100)
uint256 score = routes[i].expectedOutput *
(100 - routes[i].mevRisk) *
(100 - routes[i].priceImpact) / 10000;
if (score > bestScore) {
bestScore = score;
bestRoute = routes[i];
}
}
}
function _calculateMEVRisk(Route memory route) internal view returns (uint256 risk) {
// Factors that increase MEV risk:
// - Large trade size relative to pool
// - Low liquidity pools
// - Popular token pairs
// - Predictable execution timing
uint256 sizeRisk = _calculateSizeRisk(route);
uint256 liquidityRisk = _calculateLiquidityRisk(route);
uint256 popularityRisk = _calculatePopularityRisk(route);
risk = (sizeRisk + liquidityRisk + popularityRisk) / 3;
if (route.usesPrivatePool) {
risk = risk / 2; // 50% reduction for private pools
}
}
function _findAllRoutes(address, address, uint256) internal view returns (Route[] memory) {
return new Route[](0);
}
function _calculateSizeRisk(Route memory) internal pure returns (uint256) { return 0; }
function _calculateLiquidityRisk(Route memory) internal pure returns (uint256) { return 0; }
function _calculatePopularityRisk(Route memory) internal pure returns (uint256) { return 0; }
}
8. MEV Metrics & Monitoring
interface MEVMetrics {
// Real-time metrics
metrics: {
// Sandwich detection
'mev.sandwich.detected': Counter;
'mev.sandwich.volume': Gauge;
'mev.sandwich.profit': Gauge;
// Front-running
'mev.frontrun.detected': Counter;
'mev.frontrun.victims': Counter;
// User protection
'mev.protection.activated': Counter;
'mev.protection.savings': Gauge;
// Network health
'mev.extraction.total': Gauge;
'mev.extraction.percentage': Gauge;
};
// Alerts
alerts: [
{
name: 'high_mev_extraction',
condition: 'mev.extraction.percentage > 5',
severity: 'warning',
},
{
name: 'sandwich_attack_spike',
condition: 'rate(mev.sandwich.detected[5m]) > 10',
severity: 'critical',
},
];
}
MEV Protection Levels
| Level | Features | Latency | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basic | Slippage protection, deadline | None | Free |
| Standard | + Batch auction, fair ordering | +1 block | Low |
| Advanced | + Private mempool, encryption | +2 blocks | Medium |
| Maximum | + Threshold encryption, TEE | +3 blocks | High |
Rationale
The MEV protection mechanisms address the largest source of value extraction from DeFi users:
- Commit-reveal prevents front-running by hiding order details until execution is committed
- Batch auctions eliminate ordering games by executing all orders at a single clearing price
- Private mempools prevent validators and searchers from viewing pending transactions
- MEV-aware routing incorporates extraction risk into path optimization
- Tiered protection levels allow users to trade off latency for protection
Studies show MEV extraction exceeds $600M annually on Ethereum alone. These protections aim to return that value to users.
Backwards Compatibility
MEV protection integrates with existing infrastructure:
- Standard DEX interfaces: All protected swaps use ERC-20 approve/transfer patterns
- Router compatibility: MEVAwareRouter implements ISwapRouter interface
- Wallet integration: Works with existing wallet signing flows
- Block builders: Compatible with Flashbots, MEV Boost, and similar systems
Migration path for existing protocols:
- Deploy MEV protection contracts alongside existing router
- Update frontend to offer protection toggle
- Gradually migrate volume to protected routes
- Maintain legacy router for backward compatibility
Security Considerations
- Encryption key management - Distributed threshold
- Validator collusion - Detection and slashing
- Timing attacks - Randomized execution
- Front-running within batch - Shuffled ordering
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.